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It is common practice for companies to “anonymize” the 
consumer data that they collect. In fact, U.S. data protection 
laws and Federal Trade Commission guidelines encourage the 
practice of anonymization by exempting anonymized data from 
the privacy and data security requirements they impose. 
Anonymization involves removing personally identifiable 
information (“PII”) from a dataset so that, in theory, the data 
cannot be traced back to its data subjects. In practice, however, 
anonymization fails to irrevocably protect consumer privacy 
due to the potential for deanonymization—the linking of 
anonymized data to auxiliary information to re-identify data 
subjects. Because U.S. data protection laws provide safe 
harbors for anonymized data, re-identified data subjects 
receive no statutory privacy protections at all—a fact that is 
particularly troublesome given consumers’ dependence on 
technology and today’s climate of ubiquitous data collection. 
By adopting an all-or-nothing approach to anonymization, 
the United States has created no means of incentivizing the 
practice of anonymization while still providing data subjects 
statutory protections. This Note argues that the United States 
should look to the risk-based approach taken by the European 
Union under the General Data Protection Regulation and 
introduce multiple tiers of anonymization, which vary in their 
potential for deanonymization, into its data protection laws. 
Under this approach, pseudonymized data—i.e., certain data 
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that has had PII removed but can still be linked to auxiliary 
information to re-identify data subjects—falls within the scope 
of the governing law, but receives relaxed requirements 
designed to incentivize pseudonymization and thereby reduce 
the risk of data subject identification. This approach both 
strikes a balance between data privacy and data utility, and 
affords data subjects the benefit of anonymity in addition to 
statutory protections ranging from choice to transparency.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Data protection laws in the United States currently 
provide safe harbors to companies that “anonymize” their 
data—a practice that involves removing or obstructing the 
personally identifiable information (“PII”) in a data set so 
that, in theory, data subjects can no longer be identified.1 
These safe harbors operate under the assumption that 
anonymization renders data subjects “anonymous,” and 
thereby adequately protects consumer privacy, making it 
unnecessary to impose additional statutory privacy and data 
security protections. In practice, however, anonymization fails 
to permanently obstruct the identities of data subjects due to 
the potential for deanonymization—the linking of anonymized 
data to “auxiliary” information to re-identify data subjects.2  
As consumer data is collected from various sources, 
consumers leave “data fingerprints” that render PII-based 
protections, including anonymization exemptions, ultimately 
futile; for, as one leading privacy expert explained it, 
“everything is PII to one who has the right outside 
 
1 See infra Part II (explaining various anonymization techniques and 
U.S. data protection laws that provide safe harbors for anonymized data).  
2 See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to 
the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) 
(providing a summary of anonymization techniques, explaining that 
anonymization has failed, and discussing the implications of this failure for 
privacy law). Paul Ohm, a leading privacy expert and Professor of Law, is 
widely recognized for energizing the anonymization debate and the 
subsequent reassessment of privacy policies. 
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information.”3 Today’s climate of big data and ubiquitous data 
collection renders deanonymization increasingly feasible as it 
enables adversaries,4 such as data brokers, to amass auxiliary 
information. And problematically, there exist strong financial 
incentives, such as targeted marketing, to re-identify 
consumer data.5 As deanonymization becomes a viable and 
lucrative practice, the risk of deanonymization—and thus the 
risk of privacy harm—increases. However, because U.S. data 
protection laws exempt anonymized data, data subjects who 
are re-identified receive no statutory privacy protections. 
This fact is problematic in light of consumers’ growing 
reliance on technological advancements that make possible—
and continually normalize—pervasive data collection.6 For 
instance, consumers today heavily use their smart phones, 
which collect geolocation and other sensitive data, to satisfy 
society’s demand for constant connectivity. And as it becomes 
more practical to perform everyday tasks online, consumers 
leave a digital trail of activity, from e-mail and social media 
communications to search engine queries and payment 
transactions, with private companies that have an interest in 
collecting, storing, and selling their data. Given consumers’ 
growing reliance on such technologies, it is unrealistic to think 
that consumers have a real choice in whether to “opt-out” of 
using these products, and thereby “opt-out” of data sharing. 
 
3 Id. at 1723. To illustrate the enormity of this concept, consider the 
study conducted by Dr. Latanya Sweeney that used 1990 census data to 
show that 87.1% of people in the United States could likely be uniquely 
identified by their five-digit ZIP code, birth date, and sex alone. Latanya 
Sweeney, Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S. Population 16 
(Lab. for Int’l Data Privacy, Working Paper No. LIDAP-WP4, 2000), 
http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf 
[perma.cc/L2X8-VJW8]. 
4 The term “adversary” is used to refer to the individual or entity 
attempting to deanonymize data records. For a discussion of big data, data 
brokers, and ubiquitous data collection, see infra Section III.B. 
5 See infra Section III.B.3 (discussing the financial incentives that 
adversaries have to deanonymize consumer data).  
6 This Note merely seeks to provide a sample of such technological 
advancements in an effort to illustrate the current climate of ubiquitous 
data collection, and in no way endeavors to address the full spectrum of 
devices enabling data collection that exist today. 
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Moreover, technological advancements such as the 
Internet of Things (“IoT”)—including home automation 
systems, autonomous cars, wearable computers, and smart 
medical devices—enable an unprecedented stream of data 
collection and facilitate the collection of new types of sensitive 
consumer data.7 As these products offer enticing benefits, 
consumers choose to become users despite privacy concerns.8 
And in light of these realities, the lack of statutory privacy 
protections for re-identified data subjects is inappropriate. 
The United States has created no means of incentivizing 
the practice of anonymization, which reduces the linkability 
of data to its subjects, while still providing those same data 
subjects statutory privacy and data security protections. This 
Note contributes to the growing literature on the 
anonymization debate by arguing that the United States 
should follow the European Union’s approach to 
anonymization under the General Data Protection Regulation 
(the “GDPR”) by incorporating multiple tiers of 
anonymization requirements, which vary their obligations 
with the risk of deanonymization, into its data protection 
laws. Under the European Union’s approach, pseudonymized 
data, which has had PII removed but can still be linked to 
auxiliary information to re-identify data subjects, falls within 
the scope of the relevant data protection law—affording data 
subjects protections such as transparency, choice, and 
security—while receiving certain relaxed requirements 
designed to incentivize the practice of pseudonymization and 
thereby reduce the linkability of data to its data subjects.  
 
7 Consider, for instance, when users of Fitbit, a popular wearable 
fitness tracker, discovered that the device incidentally collected their sexual 
activity records. See Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Moves Quickly After Users’ Sex 
Stats Exposed, FORBES (July 5, 2011, 7:58 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/05/fitbit-moves-quickly-
after-users-sex-stats-exposed [perma.cc/KKC9-BA3P]. See also infra 
Section III.B.3 (discussing the Internet of Things (the “IoT”)). 
8 See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing the “convenience/privacy” 
tradeoff). See also, e.g., Robert Stroud, The Convenience/Privacy Trade-Off 
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Part II of this Note will provide an overview of 
anonymization and the safe harbors that exist for anonymized 
data under U.S. data protection laws and Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) guidelines. Part III will explain the 
failure of anonymization and problematize this failure in light 
of society’s reliance on technology, the prevalence of big data 
and data brokers, and technological advancements that 
enable unprecedented sensitive data collection. Part IV will 
engage in a comparative analysis and discuss the European 
Union’s approach to anonymization under the GDPR. Finally, 
Part IV will conclude that the United States should embrace 
a framework similar to the European Union’s by introducing 
the concept of pseudonymization into its data protection 
laws—an approach that artfully balances data privacy with 
data utility, and affords data subjects the benefit of quasi-
anonymity as well as a range of statutory privacy protections.  
II. ANONYMIZATION AND U.S. DATA 
PROTECTION LAWS 
A. Anonymization 
1. How Anonymization Works  
Anonymization forms “the core of standard procedures for 
storing or disclosing personal information.”9 Anonymization 
involves modifying a dataset to remove or encrypt PII. By 
obstructing this PII, anonymization protects data subjects’ 
privacy by reducing the linkability of the data to its subjects.  
PII is a legal concept, and the data elements that constitute 
PII are defined in the data protection law governing the data 
at issue.10 Traditionally, definitions of PII contemplated 
“direct identifiers”—or facially identifiable data such as name, 
social security number, or date of birth. However, in 
recognition of the potential for deanonymization, definitions 
of PII now also contemplate “quasi-identifiers”—or non-
 
9 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1707.   
10 See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing the data that constitute PII under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)). 
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facially identifiable data that can be linked to auxiliary 
information to re-identify data subjects.11 For example, the 
FTC has broadly defined PII to include data “reasonably 
link[able] to a specific customer, computer, or other device.”12  
There are a variety of anonymization techniques that 
satisfy anonymization exemptions under existing data 
protection laws.13 These techniques balance privacy with 
utility to varying extents. This Note will provide a brief 
overview of five of the most common anonymization 
techniques: (1) suppression, (2) generalization, 
(3) aggregation, (4) noise addition, and (5) substitution.14  
 
11 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to 
Protect the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 




5PWW] (“[T]he definition of PII should not be confined to information that 
is already linked to an individual. . . . Not only is it possible to link 
information historically considered non-PII to specific individuals or 
devices, but businesses have strong incentives to do so. . . . [The use of the 
term] ‘linkable’ extends stronger privacy protections to consumers.”). 
12 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 




13 See id. at 21 (“A variety of technical approaches to de-identification 
may be reasonable, such as deletion or modification of data fields, the 
addition of sufficient ‘noise’ to data, statistical sampling, or the use of 
aggregate or synthetic data.”). 
14 For an overview of anonymization techniques and their strengths 
and weaknesses, see ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 
05/2014 ON ANONYMISATION TECHNIQUES (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/ 
opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf [perma.cc/GQ6C-
6MNW]; GREGORY S. NELSON, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SHARING DATA: A 
PRIMER ON DATA PRIVACY, ANONYMIZATION, AND DE-IDENTIFICATION, 13–15 
(ThotWave Technologies 2015), http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/ 
proceedings15/1884-2015.pdf [perma.cc/2WFK-PT6K]; Cédric Burton & 
Sára Hoffman, Personal Data, Anonymization, and Pseudonymization in the 
EU, WSGR DATA ADVISOR (Sept. 15, 2015), 
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Suppression involves removing PII from a dataset entirely. 
While this technique provides the most protection to data 
subjects, it significantly reduces the utility of the anonymized 
data records. Generalization, in contrast, simply involves 
modifying identifier values to display, for instance, the year of 
a person’s birth instead of the full date. While this technique 
better preserves the data’s utility, it provides a much weaker 
privacy protection to data subjects. Professor Paul Ohm, the 
privacy expert who energized the anonymization debate, has 
described these two techniques as “release-and-forget” 
techniques: Once a data administrator modifies the data and 
releases the records, she “forgets, meaning she makes no 
attempt to track what happens to the records after release.”15  
Other anonymization techniques “work by relaxing either 
the release or the forget requirement.”16 For instance, 
aggregation, noise addition, and substitution substantially 
reduce the linkability of anonymized data to its data subjects 
by obstructing the raw data from view.17 Aggregation provides 
summary statistics by grouping data subjects that share some 
personal data element,18 while noise addition inserts 
imprecision into the original dataset.19 Finally, substitution 
involves directly replacing data values in the original dataset 
with other parameters—for instance, by replacing a given 




15 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1712.   
16 Id. at 1755. 
17 Even Paul Ohm has noted, “In most cases, reidentifiers will find it 
much more difficult to link answers like these to identity than if they had 
access to the underlying raw data.” Id.  
18 K-anonymity, a popular form of aggregation, ensures that a set of 
potential target records cannot be reduced to fewer than k records in the 
dataset. See Ira Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 
91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 758–59 (2016); Burton & Hoffman, supra note 14. 
19 For instance, shuffling the values of attributes in a table so that some 
attributes are artificially linked to different data subjects is a form of noise 
addition known as permutation. See, e.g., ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION 
WORKING PARTY, supra note 14, at 12.  
20 Burton & Hoffman, supra note 14. 
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2. The Purpose of Anonymization 
Privacy laws impede the free flow of information, which is 
instrumental to many essential political and economic 
functions, such as transparency and research. As Professors 
Ira S. Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog have remarked, 
“[B]lanket and robust prohibitions on information collection 
and disclosure would be incredibly costly to organizations and 
society as a whole. Shutting down research and the 
information economy would be devastating. Even if such 
restrictions were wise and politically palatable, they would 
likely be ineffective given the existing data ecosystem.”21  
Anonymization is appealing because it balances the free 
flow of information with the risk of privacy harm; it enables 
the release of valuable but sensitive information while 
reducing the linkability of that data to its subjects. For this 
reason, anonymization has been praised as a “best-of-both-
worlds compromise.”22 However, its ability to achieve this 
balance has been called into question since the weakness of 
anonymization as a privacy protection came to light.  
The failure of anonymization to permanently obstruct data 
subjects’ identifies, discussed infra, has energized a vibrant 
debate around whether anonymization is a sufficient means 
of protecting data subjects’ privacy.23 And because there is a 
negative correlation between data privacy and data utility, 
defining the proper balance lies at the heart of this debate. On 
one side of the debate, scholars defend anonymization by 
emphasizing the opportunity costs of reduced data sharing 
that stem from alternative methods of privacy protections.24 
On the other side of the debate, scholars suggest abandoning 
 
21 Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 731.  
22 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1703, 1736 (“Legislatures have deployed a 
perfect, silver bullet solution—anonymization—that has absolved them of 
the need to engage in overt balancing. Anonymization liberated lawmakers 
by letting them gloss over the measuring and weighing of countervailing 
values like security, innovation, and the free flow of information.”). 
23 See infra Section III.A (discussing the failure of anonymization, the 
anonymization debate, and policy solutions proposed by academics). 
24 See Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 4 (2011) (discussing the importance of broad data accessibility).  
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reliance on anonymization, arguing that “the benefits of being 
free from data controls do not outweigh the cost of 
relinquishing control and protection.”25 These considerations 
are important in weighing alternative privacy solutions and 
the extent to which they should employ anonymization as a 
method of striking this balance and enabling information flow.  
B. Safe Harbors for Anonymized Data Under U.S. 
Data Protection Laws  
1. Overview of U.S. Data Protection Laws   
The United States does not have a general, comprehensive 
data protection law. Rather, the United States has a 
patchwork system of laws that regulates data on a channel- or 
industry-specific basis at both the federal and state levels, 
with certain industries deemed sensitive enough to warrant 
heightened regulation by one or both levels of government.26  
At the federal level, general industry regulators enforce 
industry-specific privacy regulations. For instance, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) is 
enforced by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”).27 In the absence of a specific regulation governing 
the data at issue, the FTC is the primary federal regulatory 
authority pursuant to section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (the “FTCA”), a consumer protection law that 
 
25 Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 739 (“[W]e argue that sound 
process-based policy minimizes or eliminates ‘release-and-forget’ 
deidentification as an acceptable strategy. . . . We argue that the data 
controls are just as important as deidentification in safely releasing data 
sets.”). See also Ohm, supra note 2, at 1732, 1768 (categorizing 
anonymization techniques as a “shared hallucination” and explaining that 
“the idea that we can single out fields of information that are more linkable 
to identify than others has lost its scientific basis and must be abandoned”). 
26 Lisa J. Sotto & Aaron P. Simpson, United States, in LEGAL BUSINESS 
RESEARCH LTD., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH—DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 
2015 (Rosemary P Jay ed., 2014), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/18/2011/04/DDP2015_United_States.pdf 
[perma.cc/4EUM-DK5H]. See also Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015) (providing an overview of U.S. data privacy laws). 
27 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
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prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”28 At the state level, state attorneys general have 
the authority to bring actions for unfair or deceptive trade 
practices or enforce violations of state data protection laws.29  
There are two kinds of federal data protection laws in the 
United States: “sensitive information” laws and “protected 
channel” laws.30 Protected channel laws, such as the U.S. 
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act, regulate 
specific channels of communication.31 Sensitive information 
laws regulate data on an industry-specific basis, with some 
industries receiving more stringent protections than others. 
Data that are currently regulated on an industry-specific 
basis include medical data under HIPAA;32 consumer report 
and background screening data under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) and the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (“FACTA”);33 children’s data under the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”);34 
financial data under Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the “GBLA”);35 
and educational records under the Family Educational Rights 
 
28 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). Note that the Federal Trade Commission 
(the “FTC”) also has the authority to enforce a number of industry-specific 
laws. See Privacy & Security Update (2016), FTC (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016 [perma.cc/ 
365V-U6VK] (describing FTC enforcement authority).  
29 Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, State AGs: The Most Important 
Regulators in the U.S.?, IAPP (Nov. 26, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/state-
ags-the-most-important-regulators-in-the-us/ [perma.cc/RY9U-JY57].   
30 Ohm, supra note 26, at 1132–36.  
31 The U.S. Wiretap Act regulates the data collected by providers of 
communication services. See 18 U.S.C., ch. 119, §§ 2510-2522 (1968). The 
Stored Communications Act regulates communications stored with certain 
types of online intermediaries. See 18 U.S.C., ch. 121, §§ 2701–2712 (1986).  
32 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-109, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
33 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952. 
34 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (1998) 
35 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
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and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).36 There is no accepted definition 
for when data meets the requisite sensitivity to warrant its 
own law, and existing laws were enacted on an ad hoc basis.37 
Many categories of data that are deemed sensitive enough 
to warrant heightened protections in other legal systems, such 
as in the European Union, do not receive heightened 
protections in the United States. For instance, the GDPR 
designates “special categories of personal data” that are 
subject to heightened protections, including “data concerning 
a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation” in this 
category.38 In the United States, such data, and all other data 
not governed by a channel-specific or industry-specific federal 
law, are left under the protection of the FTC pursuant to 
section 5 of the FTCA, as well as state attorneys general.39  
2. Exemptions Under HIPAA 
HIPAA was enacted with the broad purpose of improving 
health insurance coverage and health care delivery, and is 
among the most significant privacy laws in the United States. 
The portion of HIPAA that regulates the privacy of personal 
 
36 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 
Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).  
37 See Ohm, Sensitive Information, supra note 26, at 1130, 1140 (“[N]ew 
categories of sensitive information are rarely added to the positive law of 
privacy, and categories already enshrined in law are never removed.”). 
38 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 9(1) 2016 O.J. (L119) The full list 
of “special categories” includes “personal data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union 
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the 
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or 
data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.”  
39 This Note is primarily focused on statutory law in the United States. 
However, the dissemination of certain data, including sexually explicit data, 
may also violate common law privacy torts. The common law includes a 
requirement that the privacy tort of disclosure involve disclosure of facts 
that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” which have been 
found to include information about sexual activity. Ohm, supra note 26, at 
1134. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 842 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining defendants from disseminating a video depicting 
plaintiffs’ sexual activity, finding that plaintiffs made the requisite showing 
of success on the merits for their claim of violation of the right to privacy).  
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health information (“PHI”) is known as the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule.40 Among other things, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires 
appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of PHI, sets 
limits and conditions on the use and disclosure of PHI with 
and without patient authorization, and gives patients rights 
over their PHI, including the right to obtain a copy of their 
health records and to request corrections.41 To illustrate the 
regulatory approach to anonymized data in the United States, 
this Section will discuss the exemption for de-identified health 
information (“DHI”) under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.42  
A major goal of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is to “strike[] a 
balance that permits important uses of information, while 
protecting the privacy of people who seek care and healing.”43 
HIPAA expressly exempts DHI from regulation under the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule if the information is anonymized per 
HIPAA’s de-identification standard and implementation 
specifications.44 HIPAA defines DHI as “[h]ealth information 
that does not identify an individual and with respect to which 
there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information 
 
40 The HIPAA Privacy Rule is located at 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and 
Subparts A and E of Part 164. See also The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS (last 
updated Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/index.html [perma.cc/S9CT-HQBG].  
41 See The HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 40. 
42 See NELSON, supra note 14, at 8 (“[HIPAA is] one of the primary 
standards used to provide guidance for de-identifying [PII] and [PHI].”); 
Ohm, supra note 2, at 1737 (“[HIPAA is] the high-water mark for the use of 
PII to balance privacy risks against valuable uses of information.”).  
43 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS (last updated July 26, 
2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-
regulations/index.html [perma.cc/RDV6-F5KU] (stating that a key objective 
was to “assure that individuals’ health information is properly protected 
while allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote 
high quality health care and to protect the public’s health and well being”). 
44 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2017) (“Health information that meets the 
standard and implementation specifications for de-identification under 
§ 164.514(a) and (b) is considered not to be individually identifiable health 
information, i.e., de-identified. The requirements of [Subpart E – Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information] do not apply to information 
that has been de-identified.”). 
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can be used to identify an individual.”45 To constitute DHI 
under HIPAA, information that is anonymized must satisfy 
the requirements of one of two standards: (1) the Expert 
Determination standard46 or (2) the Safe Harbor standard.47 
To satisfy the Expert Determination standard, a person 
with “appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally 
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for 
rendering information not individually identifiable” must 
conclude that the risk is “very small” that the information 
“could be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably 
available information, by an anticipated recipient” to identify 
a data subject.48 It is noteworthy that this standard contains 
several qualifiers that fail to preclude, in absolute terms, the 
possibility of reidentification: (1) the risk of identification need 
only be “very small”; (2) the auxiliary information must be 
“reasonably” available; and (3) the risk of reidentification is 
limited to that by the “anticipated recipient” as opposed to 
that by any adversary who gains access to the information.  
DHI is alternatively exempt from HIPAA if it satisfies the 
Safe Harbor standard. The Safe Harbor standard requires (1) 
the removal of eighteen enumerated identifiers of the 
individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of 
the individual,49 and (2) that “the Covered Entity does not 
have actual knowledge that the information could be used 
alone, or in combination with other information, to identify” 
 
45 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). 
46 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1). 
47 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). 
48 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1).  
49 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). These data elements are: (A) names, (B) 
geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, (C) all elements of dates 
(except year) directly related to the individual including birth date and date 
of death, (D) telephone numbers, (E) fax numbers, (F) e-mail addresses, (G) 
social security numbers, (H) medical record numbers, (I) health plan 
beneficiary numbers, (J) account numbers, (K) certificate/license numbers, 
(L) vehicle identifiers such as license plate numbers, (M) device identifiers 
and serial numbers, (N) URLs, (O) IP addresses, (P) biometric identifiers 
including finger and video prints, (Q) full face photographic images, and (R) 
“any other unique identifying number, characteristic or code” beyond those 
permitted in 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c). 
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the data subject.50 This standard too contains qualifiers that 
fail to preclude the possibility of reidentification: (1) only the 
eighteen identifiers enumerated must be removed;51 and (2) 
the Covered Entity must have actual knowledge that the 
information could be used to identify the data subject.  
In addition to creating an exemption for DHI and 
prescribing mandatory mechanisms for anonymization, the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule creates implementation specifications 
that allow covered entities to re-identify DHI. Specifically, 
HIPAA allows a covered entity to “assign a code or other 
means of record identification to allow information de-
identified . . . to be re-identified by the covered entity” as long 
as (1) the means of record identification is not “derived from 
or related to” information about the data subject or otherwise 
capable of being “translated” so as to identify the data subject, 
and (2) the covered entity does not use or disclose the means 
of record identification “for any other purpose” or disclose the 
mechanism for re-identification.52 HIPAA clarifies that if de-
identified information is re-identified, the covered entity’s use 
and disclosure of the information must comply with the 
requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.53 
3. Exemptions Under FTC Guidelines 
The FTC is the primary federal regulatory authority for all 
data not governed by a channel- or industry-specific federal 
law.54 In 2012, the FTC issued a final report setting forth best 
practices for commercial entities that collect or use consumer 
 
50 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii). The term “Covered Entity” is defined 
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule to include (1) a health plan; (2) a health care 
clearinghouse; and (3) a health care provider who transmits any health 
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by 
Subchapter C of HIPAA. 45 CFR § 160.103. Id. 
51 See also infra Section III.A.1 (problematizing data protection laws 
that define PII by reference to an enumerated list of data elements).   
52 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c). 
53 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2)(i)–(ii). 
54 See supra Section II.B.1. 
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data.55 The report contained a framework (the “FTC Privacy 
Framework”) for protecting consumer privacy that urged 
companies to adopt three practices: (1) privacy by design; (2) 
simplified choice; and (3) greater transparency. The report 
called on companies to make “privacy the ‘default setting’ for 
commercial data practices and giv[e] consumers greater 
control over the collection and use of their personal data 
through simplified choice and increased transparency.”56  
Importantly for purposes of this Note, the FTC Privacy 
Framework contains an exemption for anonymized data: The 
scope of the FTC Privacy Framework is limited to commercial 
entities that collect or use consumer data that can be 
“reasonably linked to a specific consumer, computer, or other 
device.”57 The FTC’s inclusion of “reasonably linked” ignited 
concerns that the FTC Privacy Framework provided “less 
incentive for a business to try to de-identify the data it 
maintains” since, “with improvements in technology and the 
ubiquity of public information, more and more data could be 
‘reasonably linked’ to a consumer, computer or device.”58 In 
response to these concerns, the FTC revised its privacy 
framework to qualify the definition of “reasonably linked.”  
 
55 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12. The FTC explained the purpose 
of the Report, stating:  
The final framework is intended to articulate best practices 
for companies that collect and use consumer data . . . [and] 
intended to assist Congress as it considers privacy 
legislation. To the extent the framework goes beyond 
existing legal requirements, the framework is not intended 
to serve as a template for law enforcement actions or 
regulations under laws currently enforced by the FTC. 
Id. at iii. 
56 Id. at i. 
57 Id. at iv (emphasis added). In order to address concerns about “undue 
burdens on small businesses,” the report additionally exempts commercial 
entities that collect only non-sensitive data from fewer than 5000 consumers 
a year, provided that they do not share the data with third parties. 
58 Id. For the FTC’s full discussion of anonymization and response to 
these comments, see id. at 18–22 (explaining that the exemption generated 
the most comments to the report from a wide range of interested parties). 
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These revisions clarified that data is not reasonably 
linkable—and thus outside the scope of the FTC’s Privacy 
Framework—to the extent that a company (1) takes 
“reasonable measures” to ensure that the data is de-identified; 
(2) publicly commits not to try to re-identify the data; and (3) 
contractually prohibits downstream recipients from trying to 
re-identify the data.59 The FTC explained that if a company 
takes steps to re-identify de-identified data in violation of this 
“reasonable linkability” standard, “its conduct could be 
actionable under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”60 The FTC further 
elucidated the term “reasonable measures,” stating that a 
company “must achieve a reasonable level of justified 
confidence that the data cannot reasonably be used to infer 
information about, or otherwise be linked to, a particular 
consumer, computer, or other device.”61 The FTC explained 
that “reasonable measures” entail a subjective and factual 
inquiry that depends on the circumstances at issue, including 
the available methods and technologies, the nature of the 
data, and the purposes for which the data will be used.62 
By broadening its exemption to incentivize commercial 
entities to de-identify consumer data, the FTC operates under 
the assumption that anonymization per its standards protects 
consumer privacy better than the combined privacy and data 
security rules imposed by FTC’s Privacy Framework—
namely, privacy by design, simplified choice, and greater 
transparency. This is the case for any data protection law, 
such as HIPAA, that exempts anonymized data from its scope.  
III. DEANONYMIZATION AND PRIVACY HARM 
Data anonymization fails to irrevocably protect the privacy 
of data subjects due to the potential for deanonymization—the 
 
59 Id. at iv, 22 (“The clarification of the framework’s reasonable 
linkability standard is designed to help address the concern that the 
standard is overly broad [and] gives companies an incentive to collect and 
use data in a form that makes it less likely the data will be linked to a 
particular consumer or device, thereby promoting privacy.”). 
60 Id. at 21.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
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linking of anonymized data records to auxiliary information 
to re-identify data subjects. As a consequence of 
deanonymization risk, the exemptions that exist for 
anonymized data under U.S. data protection laws do not 
provide absolute privacy protections to anonymized data 
subjects, and in fact result in re-identified data subjects 
receiving no statutory privacy protections at all.  
The prevalence of big data and ubiquitous data collection 
today renders deanonymization increasingly feasible, as 
adversaries such as data brokers amass consumer data, and 
information about consumers becomes publicly available 
online. Moreover, there are strong financial incentives to re-
identify consumer data for purposes such as targeted 
marketing. As the re-identification of consumer data becomes 
a viable and lucrative business, the risk of deanonymization 
increases and consumers become more exposed to privacy 
harm. Accordingly, this Note argues that the current lack of 
statutory privacy protections for re-identified data subjects is 
inadequate—particularly in light of pervasive data collection, 
technological advancements enabling new forms of sensitive 
data collection, and society’s growing reliance on technology.  
 Section III.A will discuss deanonymization, the U.S. 
regulatory response to the risk of deanonymization, and the 
scholarly debate around the future of anonymization as a tool 
to protect consumer privacy. Section III.B will problematize 
the failure of anonymization against the modern realities of 
technological dependency, omnipresent data collection, and 
technological advancements that enable unprecedented forms 
of sensitive data collection. 
A. The Failure of Anonymization 
1. Deanonymizaiton  
Deanonymization63 occurs when adversaries re-identify 
anonymized data subjects by linking anonymized data records 
 
63 Some scholars prefer to use the terms “re-identification” and “de-
identification” over “anonymization” and “deanonymization,” since “the 
concept of ‘anonymity’ or ‘anonymization’ . . . implicitly guarantees 
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to outside, or auxiliary, information—a practice known as a 
linkage attack.64 To understand this concept, consider Dr. 
Latanya Sweeney’s re-identification of the hospitalization 
records of Governor Weld. An insurance agency had released 
anonymized hospitalization records to the public for research, 
removing direct identifiers but leaving demographic and 
sensitive health data. Dr. Sweeney matched these records to 
publicly available voter registration records containing 
similar demographic data to re-identify Governor Weld.65  
The potential for deanonymization exists across the range 
of anonymization techniques, and certain techniques render 
deanonymization easier than others.66 Of course, the more 
anonymous the data is, the lower the risk of deanonymization; 
however, even techniques that never release the raw data—
such as aggregation, noise addition, and substitution—have 
the potential to be deanonymized using the right outside 
information.67 To support this claim, privacy experts have 
pointed to proof that the Census Bureau provided aggregated, 
city-block-level data that—despite not identifying particular 
houses or families—helped locate and send Japanese 
Americans to internment camps during World War II.68  
The ability to execute a linkage attack is made easier by 
the growing availability of consumer information to private 
entities and the public: “The more information about a person 
 
protection of identity.” Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 707; see also 
Ohm, supra note 2, at 1744 (“[W]e need a new word for privacy-motivated 
data manipulation that connotes only effort, not success.”). 
64 Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 711. 
65 Latanya Sweeney, K-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 
INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557, 
558–59 (2002). See also Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 711. 
66 See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing anonymization techniques). 
67 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also Ohm, supra note 
2, at 1756 (explaining that, not only do these techniques offer limited utility 
and require constant maintenance by the data administrator, but that they, 
too, can be reverse engineered with the requisite auxiliary data). 
68 See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 2, at 1756 (citing William Seltzer & Margo 
Anderson, Population Association of America, After Pearl Harbor: The 
Proper Role of Population Data Systems in Time of War (Mar. 28, 2000) 
(unpublished paper)). Ohm provides a number of other examples as well. Id. 
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that is known, the more likely it becomes that this information 
can be used to identify that person or determine further data 
about her.”69 And since the “phenomenon of data availability 
heightens the ability to turn non-PII into PII,”70 data 
protection laws that enumerate a static list of identifiers to 
define PII, and that create anonymization exemptions for data 
obstructing those identifiers, have been criticized for their 
“arbitrar[y] . . . categorization[s].”71 Ohm, for instance, has 
problematized HIPAA’s Safe Harbor standard: 
By enumerating eighteen identifiers, the [HIPAA] 
Privacy Rule assumes that any other information that 
might be contained in a health record cannot be used 
to reidentify. We now understand the flaw in this 
reasoning, and we should consider revising the 
Privacy Rule as a result . . . . Easy reidentification 
makes PII-focused laws like HIPAA underproductive 
by exposing the arbitrariness of their intricate 
categorization and line drawing.72  
Several high-profile anonymization failures have drawn 
attention to the risk of deanonymization.73 For instance, in 
2006, AOL published a sample of de-identified search queries, 
including searches such as “depression and medical leave,” 
“fear that spouse contemplating cheating,” and “how to kill 
your wife.”74 AOL suppressed the PII, including IP address, 
and substituted each AOL username with a unique numeric 
 
69 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and 
a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1814, 1843 (2011); Scott Berinato, There’s No Such Thing as Anonymous 
Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/02/theres-no-
such-thing-as-anonymous-data [perma.cc/YF4C-6S6C] (“Anonymization . . . 
is ‘inadequate’ and ultimately doomed to fail with large metadata—the kind 
of publicly available big data that so many companies are tapping into.”). 
70 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 69, at 1812. 
71 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1740. 
72 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1737–38, 1740. See also notes 49–51 and 
accompanying text (discussing HIPAA’s Safe Harbor standard). 
73 But see Yakowitz, supra note 24, at 16, 36 (arguing that undue 
emphasis is placed on these publicized failures, and that data presents no 
more of risk of re-identification than other tolerated risks, such as garbage). 
74 See Ohm, supra note 2, at 1717. 
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code (e.g., No. 4417749).75 However, the queries themselves 
contained personal information, and because every query was 
associated with a numeric code representing an AOL 
username, journalists were able to link the queries associated 
with the same AOL username to discern the identity of that 
user. Within a few days, the New York Times revealed the 
identity of sixty-two year old Thelma Arnold, who conducted 
multiple searches including “60 single men,” “landscapers in 
Lilburn, Ga,” “people with the last name Arnold,” and “homes 
sold in shadow lake subdivision Gwinnet county georgia.”76 
In another publicized incident, Netflix published a dataset 
containing one hundred million anonymized movie ratings as 
part of its “Netflix Prize,” an effort to improve its movie 
recommendations by awarding the first team to significantly 
improve its algorithms one million dollars. Each record 
included a unique subscriber ID, movie title, year of release, 
and rental date.77 Shortly after the release, two researchers 
re-identified many of the Netflix subscribers contained in the 
dataset by matching their Netflix reviews with data from 
IMDb. The researchers found that if an adversary knew the 
movies that a Netflix subscriber had rented in a given time 
period, the adversary could reverse-engineer the data to 
discover the subscriber’s entire viewing history.78  
 
75 Id.  
76 See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL 
Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html (“[I]t did not take much investigating to 
follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold . . . . [T]he detailed records of 
searches conducted . . . underscore how much people unintentionally reveal 
about themselves when they use search engines—and how risky it can be 
for companies like AOL, Google, and Yahoo to compile such data.”). 
77 See, e.g., Julianne Pepitone, 5 Data Breaches: From Embarrassing to 
Deadly: Netflix Accidentally Reveals Rental Histories, CNN MONEY (2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/technology/1012/gallery.5_data_breac
hes/ [perma.cc/S8EJ-6NC6].  
78 See Arvind Narayanan & Vitalty Schamtikov, Robust De-
anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. 
& PRIVACY 111 (2008). The researchers explained:  
[A]n adversary who knows a little bit about some subscriber 
can easily identify her record if it is present in the dataset, 
or, at the very least, identify a small set of records which 
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2. The U.S. Regulatory Response 
The failure of anonymization has called into question 
whether anonymization can or should be exclusively relied 
upon to prevent privacy harm. However, the safe harbors for 
anonymized data that exist under U.S. data protection laws 
were created by lawmakers who knew of the potential for re-
identification. For instance, in reference to the debate over its 
“reasonable linkability” standard,79 the FTC’s report 
containing the FTC Privacy Framework directly addressed 
the failure of anonymization, stating that “[t]here is 
significant evidence demonstrating that technological 
advances and the ability to combine disparate pieces of data 
can lead to identification of a consumer, computer, or device 
even if the individual pieces of data do not constitute PII.”80 
Nevertheless, the FTC declined to reject anonymization as 
an insufficient privacy protection. Explaining this decision, 
the FTC assessed the comments it received from privacy 
advocates and industry representatives. The FTC explained 
that privacy advocates support the “reasonable-linkability” 
standard due to (1) consumers’ objections to being tracked 
even without the use of PII, (2) the ability of adversaries to re-
identify “anonymous” data, (3) the existence of industries that 
have turned re-identification for marketing purposes into a 
commercial enterprise, and (4) consumers’ privacy interest in 
data going beyond mere PII to aggregated or de-identified 
data.81 The FTC also explained the opposition of industry 
representatives, citing their claims that (1) the risk associated 
with PII is not the same as that associated with data not 
containing PII, (2) the “reasonable linkability” standard is 
“potentially too open-ended to be practical” since, “given 
 
include the subscriber’s record. The adversary’s background 
knowledge need not be precise, e.g., the dates may only be 
known to the adversary with a 14-day error, the ratings may 
be known only approximately, and some of the ratings and 
dates may even be completely wrong. 
Id. at 112. 
79 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.  
80 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 20. 
81 See id. at 18–19. 
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enough time and resources, any data may be linkable to an 
individual,” and (3) that requiring the same level of protection 
for all data would “undermine companies’ incentive to avoid 
collecting data that is more easily identified or take steps to 
de-identify the data they use or collect.”82 In consideration of 
these opinions, the FTC settled on its qualified “reasonable-
linkability” standard with exemptions for anonymized data.83 
3. The Academic Debate over Anonymization  
There has been lively academic debate surrounding the 
future of anonymization as a privacy protection among both 
legal scholars and privacy experts, including Paul Ohm, Jane 
Yakowitz, Ira S. Rubinstein, and Woodrow Hartzog.84 Their 
views lend to very different regulatory approaches.  
Ohm has taken a critical view of anonymization, 
categorizing it as a failure and pushing for its abandonment 
as an exclusive means of privacy protection.85 Because the 
definition of PII expands as technological advancements 
enable quasi-identifiers to be used to re-identify data subjects, 
Ohm argues that privacy regulations should not enumerate 
specific data elements that constitute PII, and that any law 
that draws distinctions based solely on whether particular 
data types can be linked to identify should be reevaluated.86 
Ohm has also dismissed three possible solutions as 
insufficient: (1) harm compensation; (2) waiting for technology 
 
82 See id. at 19–20. 
83 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
84 For an illustration of their views on anonymization, see Ohm, supra 
note 2; Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18; Yakowitz, supra note 24.  
85 Ohm, supra note 2, at 1742–43 (“At the very least, we must abandon 
the pervasively held idea that we can protect privacy by simply removing 
personally identifiable information . . . . [Anonymization] should no longer 
be considered to provide meaningful guarantees of privacy.”). 
86 “No matter how effectively regulators follow the latest 
reidentification research, folding newly identified data fields into new laws 
and regulations, researchers will always find more data field types they 
have not yet covered. The list of potential PII will never stop growing until 
it includes everything.” Id. 
BRASHER_FINAL  
232 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
to “save us”; and (3) banning re-identification.87 Rather, Ohm 
suggests weighing the benefits of information flow with the 
costs of privacy harm and incorporating risk assessment 
strategies.88 He further argues that neither industry-specific 
nor comprehensive, cross-industry privacy reform alone will 
be effective, and suggests instead implementing general 
regulation that sets a realistic privacy floor while tailoring 
specific laws to address industry-specific privacy risks.89   
Yakowitz represents the opposite side of the debate. While 
she recognizes the limitations of anonymization, she argues 
that Ohm overstates the risk of harm and that the benefits of 
information flow exceed the deanonymization risk.90 She 
contends that guarding anonymized information leads to a 
“tragedy of the data commons”: When a “data subject depletes 
the commons by removing his data,” “the marginal detriment 
of his decision is externalized and shared across the entire 
population” while “he enjoys the full value of the avoided risk 
of re-identification.”91 She further criticizes current U.S. 
legislation for its regulation of the release of data, as opposed 
to its use.92 She concludes that public research data should in 
fact be easier to disseminate, and argues that while there 
should be harsh punishment for adversaries who intentionally 
re-identify data subjects, data administrators should receive 
immunity from statutory and common law privacy claims if 
they undergo basic anonymization techniques.93  
Finally, Rubinstein and Hartzog offer a middle-ground, 
process-based approach that focuses on risk assessment and 
the implementation of technical, physical, and procedural 
safeguards—including data flow controls—in addition to 
 
87 See id.  
88 Id. at 1759. 
89 Id. at 1762. 
90 See Yakowitz, supra note 24. 
91 Id. at 4.  
92 Id. at 42. 
93 Id. at 5.  
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anonymization.94 They state that, in lieu of today’s output-
based approaches that strive for perfect anonymization, 
A more sustainable approach would focus on the 
preconditions and processes necessary for protection. 
It is hard to ensure protection. It is easier, however, to 
ensure that data custodians follow appropriate 
processes for minimizing risk, which may include both 
deidentification in combination with legal and 
administrative tools. . . . Approaches that focus on 
transparency, disclosure, harm and permission all 
seem inadequate, at least by themselves, to respond to 
the failure of anonymization.95 
They suggest that the solution be contextually sensitive to 
account for factors such as the motivation for re-identification, 
harms that can result from re-identification, and the utility of 
the de-identified data.96 They also suggest that the solution 
be “risk tolerant”: “By focusing on process instead of output, 
data release policy can aim to raise the cost of reidentification 
and sensitive attribute disclosure to acceptable levels without 
having to ensure perfect anonymization.”97  
While the anonymization debate in the United States is far 
from resolved, the regulatory status quo retains exemptions 
for anonymized data. This Note will now problematize the 
lack of statutory privacy protections for re-identified data 
subjects in light of several modern realities—specifically, 
consumers’ growing reliance on technology; technological 
advancements that enable omnipresent and increasingly 
sensitive data collection; and the financial incentives that 
exist to re-identify consumer data.  
 
94 Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 702–03, 706, 737 (“[W]e 
recommend including both deidentification techniques and controls on data 
flow as part of data release policy.”). 
95 Id. at 729–31. 
96 Id. at 735–36 (“All of these factors mean that a ‘one size fits all’ 
standard for data release policy will not be effective. Such attempts are 
doomed to be either over-protective or under-protective.”). They accordingly 
applaud the FTC’s “reasonably linkability” standard. Id. at 736. 
97 Id. at 736–37. 
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B. Modern Realities that Increase the Privacy Harm 
Resulting from Deanonymization  
1. The Convenience/Privacy Tradeoff and 
Consumers’ Reliance on Technology 
Technology increasingly pervades consumers’ lives, and 
while it adds enormous value, its pervasiveness comes at a 
cost: the “convenience/privacy tradeoff.” As technologies 
ranging from smartphones and fitness trackers to search 
engines and geolocation-tracking applications offer 
compelling benefits, consumers “seem increasingly resigned to 
giving up fundamental aspects of their privacy for 
convenience . . . and have grudgingly accepted that being 
monitored by corporations . . . is just a fact of modern life.”98  
Similarly, a 2016 study by the Pew Research Center 
assessed the extent to which Americans would be willing to 
provide personal information in exchange for certain deals 
(e.g., discounts) and found that there are a “variety of 
circumstances under which many Americans would share 
personal information or permit surveillance in return for 
getting something of perceived value.”99 Yet, it also found that 
they are “frequently unhappy about what happens to that 
information once companies have collected it.”100 Such 
tradeoffs are increasingly common today. Consider, for 
 
98 Liz Mineo, On Internet Privacy, Be Very Afraid, HARV. L. TODAY (Aug. 
25, 2017), https://today.law.harvard.edu/internet-privacy-afraid/ [perma.cc/ 
8XLY-VHK9) (interviewing cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier). See 
Robert Stroud, The Convenience/Privacy Trade-Off on the Internet of 
Things, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2013), http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/the-
convenience-privacy-trade-off-on-the-internet-of-things [perma.cc/5K73-
DCE9] (“Whether it is using geolocation tracking on photo-sharing apps or 
understanding search habits for targeted ads, our complex, interconnected 
world is increasingly asking customers and enterprises alike to weigh the 
pros and cons of convenience factors vs. threats to data privacy and security. 
As hype gives way to concerns, individuals and organizations must . . . 
account for both the opportunities and hazards . . . .”). 
99 Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, PEW 
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instance, smart thermostats—devices that allow consumers to 
save on their energy bills by monitoring their movements 
around the home101—or telematics devices—devices that 
allow consumers to save on their car insurance by monitoring 
their driving habits, such as speed and distance driven.102  
And consumers today are not merely encouraged to trade 
off privacy for perceived efficiency, financial, and other 
benefits. Frequently, they lack any real choice in the matter. 
As cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier aptly explains, 
Consumers are concerned about their privacy and 
don’t like companies knowing their intimate secrets. 
But they feel powerless and are resigned to the privacy 
invasions because they don’t have any real choice. 
People need to own credit cards, carry cellphones, and 
have email addresses and social media accounts. 
That’s what it takes to be a fully functioning human 
being in the 21st century. This is why we need the 
government to step in.103 
As society adjusts to technological innovation, it develops 
a reliance on the benefits that technology brings, and 
consumers lose their ability to opt-out.104 It is simply 
unrealistic to say that consumers have free choice over 
whether to avail themselves of technology, and whether to 
 
101 See e.g., id.; see generally SMART THERMOSTAT GUIDE, 
https://smartthermostatguide.com/ [perma.cc/9RFV-CBUK]. 
102 See, e.g., Rainie & Duggan, supra note 99; What Is a Telematics 
Device?, ALLSTATE (Jan. 2014), https://www.allstate.com/tools-and-
resources/car-insurance/telematics-device.aspx [perma.cc/CUL2-27TT]. 
103 Mineo, supra note 99. 
104 Id. For just one example, a growing number of businesses today 
refuse to accept cash from their customers. See, e.g., Andy Newman, Cash 
Might Be King, but They Don’t Care, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/25/nyregion/no-cash-money-cashless-
credit-debit-card.html (“[In Midtown and some other neighborhoods across 
New York City, cashless is fast on its way to becoming normal.”). For there 
is “no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an 
organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or 
services.” FAQs, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm [perma.cc/LM8R-
96F6]. As cashless becomes the new normal, the need for credit cards grows. 
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hand their personal data over to the businesses behind those 
technologies that collect, store, and share consumer data.105  
2. Technological Advancements Enabling 
Unprecedented Data Collection 
Consumers’ growing resignation toward, and lack of 
control over, their data-sharing is problematic in light of 
technological advancements that enable unprecedented forms 
of sensitive data collection in every corner of their lives. For 
instance, the advancement of IoT increasingly connects 
everyday objects to the internet while both (1) creating new 
channels for collecting consumer data and (2) enabling the 
collection of new kinds of consumer data. These devices 
include home automation systems, autonomous cars, activity 
tracking devices, and smart medical devices106—technologies 
the FTC described in 2015 as “unimaginable a decade ago.”107  
In 2015, the FTC issued a report on IoT recognizing that 
these devices create significant privacy risks: some risks 
involving the “direct collection of sensitive personal 
information, such as precise geolocation, financial account 
numbers, or health information,” and others arising from the 
“collection of personal information, habits, locations, and 
 
105 “And ‘buyer beware’ is putting too much onus on the individual.” 
Mineo, supra note 99 (quoting cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier). 
106 For a discussion of IoT and the medical industry, see, e.g., Karen 
Taylor, By 2020 the Smart Hospital Will Be a Reality, FUTURE HEALTH INDEX 
(June 13, 2017), https://www.futurehealthindex.com/2017/06/13/by-2020-
the-smart-hospital-will-be-a-reality/ [perma.cc/LY3G-HPXQ]; Sarah 
Neville, US Regulators Approve First Digital Pill with Tracking System, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/267b890a-a9b5-
11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 [perma.cc/3KRY-CCBN]. 
107 “Experts estimate that, as of this year, there will be 25 billion 
connected devices, and by 2020, 50 billion.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET 
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physical conditions over time, which may allow an entity that 
has not directly collected sensitive information to infer it.”108 
Regarding data volume, the FTC acknowledged: 
The sheer volume of data that even a small number of 
devices can generate is stunning: one participant 
indicated that fewer than 10,000 households using the 
company’s IoT home-automation product can 
‘generate 150 million discrete data points a day’ or 
approximately one data point every six seconds for 
each household.109 
As the FTC observed, “Such a massive volume of granular 
data allows those with access to the data to perform analyses 
that would not be possible with less rich data sets.”110 And 
importantly, as this data becomes available to adversaries, 
linkage attacks become easier and deanonymization risk 
increases. Moreover, not only do technological advancements 
like IoT make data collection more pervasive and generate 
greater data volume, but they enable the collection of new 
kinds of sensitive data. The exposure of consumers’ sexually 
explicit data, a category classified as sensitive under the 
GDPR, illustrates this point.111 
In 2016, a lawsuit against an adult product company 
initiated a conversation around the collection of sexually 
explicit data.112 The complaint alleged that the smartphone-
controlled device used its internet connectivity to transmit 
data on consumers’ usage, including user identifiers and the 
 
108 Id. at 14 (emphasis added) (noting commentators’ concerns that “the 
trend towards abundant collection of data creates a ‘non-targeted dragnet 
collection from devices in the environment’” and that “companies might use 
this data to make credit, insurance, and employment decisions”).  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 15 (“According to a [workshop] participant, ‘researchers are 
beginning to show that existing smartphone sensors can be used to infer a 
user’s mood; stress levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics 
(e.g., gender, marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; overall well-
being; progression of Parkinson’s disease; sleep patterns; happiness; levels 
of exercise; and types of physical activity or movement.’”). 
111 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
112 See Complaint at 2, N.P. v. Standard Innovation (US) Corp., No. 
1:16-cv-08655 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 2, 2016). 
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date, duration, and settings of each use, in real-time back to 
its manufacturer without consumers’ consent.113 In response, 
the company stated, “We do collect certain limited data to help 
us improve our products and for diagnostic purposes. As a 
matter of practice, we use this data in the aggregate, non-
identifiable form.”114 Though the parties settled, the company 
updated its privacy policies and added an option for customers 
to opt-out of sharing anonymous app usage data.115 The 
lawsuit highlighted the unprecedented capacity of IoT to 
collect sensitive consumer data—a fact that the lawyer for the 
firm representing plaintiffs acknowledged: “[O]f all the 
privacy violations our firm has prosecuted, this is among the 
most personal and invasive we have ever encountered.”116 
The potential for unprecedented sexually explicit data 
collection—and the collection of numerous other forms of 
sensitive data—is not limited to advancements in IoT. Widely 
popular dating sites and applications such as Tinder also 
collect information about their users’ sex lives, such as sexual 
 
113 Id. 
114 Our Commitment to Customer Privacy and Security, WE-VIBE (Aug. 
12, 2016), http://we-vibe.com/blog/our-commitment-to-customer-privacy-
and-security [perma.cc/4LH6-DYCJ]. 
115 N.P. v. Standard Innovation Corp—We-Vibe Settlement, HEFFLER 
CLAIMS GRP., http://www.sicclassactionsettlement.com/ [perma.cc/K7DK-
ZR97] (providing settlement details); We-Connect App and Privacy Update, 
WE-VIBE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://we-vibe.com/blog/we-connect-app-and-
privacy-update/ [perma.cc/4QY9-GP4R] (explaining the privacy update). 
116 The lawyer observed that “[w]hile this particular example shocks 
the conscience more than most, it should also put consumers on notice that 
the ‘internet of things,’ while providing convenience and assistance in their 
daily lives, is also ripe for unauthorized data collection.” Molly Redden, Tech 
Company Accused of Collecting Details of How Consumers Use Sex Toys, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/14/wevibe-sex-toy-data-collection-chicago-lawsuit 
[perma.cc/M62G-RB2M]. Though this type of data collection is arguably 
limited to a narrow consumer base, the global adult toys market is expected 
to exceed $29 billion by 2020. Global Adult Toys Market to Exceed USD 29 
Billion by 2020, According to Technavio, BUS. WIRE (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160412005747/en/Global-
Adult-Toys-Market-Exceed-USD-29 [perma.cc/5MUE-K78S].  
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orientation and preferences.117 In some contexts, this data can 
be sensitive, and its unauthorized release can be extremely 
harmful. In 2015, hackers stole user data collected by Ashley 
Madison, a dating website designed for extramarital affairs, 
and released the data onto the dark web. The release exposed 
thirty-six million users’ data, including their names, street 
addresses, e-mail addresses, and interests.118 People whose 
data had been released suffered harms ranging from public 
humiliation for themselves and their families to suicide and, 
in countries where infidelity and homosexuality are 
punishable offenses—such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines—the risk of prison, flogging, and execution.119 
The Ashley Madison breach also highlighted the capacity 
for extortion in the data privacy context. Following the breach, 
extortionists blackmailed data subjects,120 underscoring the 
fact that sensitive data can create leverage for extortion. This 
potential for extortion leads to an undesirable incentive for 
adversaries to re-identify sensitive consumer data. 
 
117 See generally Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder for My Data. It Sent 
Me 800 Pages of My Deepest, Darkest Secrets, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-
data-dating-app-messages-hacked-sold [perma.cc/Q2ZY-G7K8]. 
118 Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, 
WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-
posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/ [perma.cc/D9JC-3KQY]. 
119 See, e.g., Ashley Madison Hack: 2 Unconfirmed Suicides Linked to 
Breach, Toronto Police Say, CBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ashley-madison-hack-2-
unconfirmed-suicides-linked-to-breach-toronto-police-say-1.3201432; 
Patrick Cain, Where 1,296 Gay Ashley Madison Users Face Prison, Flogging, 
Execution, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://globalnews.ca/news 
/2186587/where-1296-gay-ashley-madison-users-face-prison-flogging-
execution/; Natasha Noman, The Dark Side of the Ashley Madison Hack that 
Nobody’s Talking About, MIC (Aug. 20, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/ 
124169/the-ashley-madison-hack-could-effect-those-who-live-in-country 
[perma.cc/5468-V8RN]. 
120 See, e.g., Cory Bennett, Extortion Begins for Ashley Madison Hack 
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3. Targeted Marketing, Data Brokers, and 
Incentives to De-Identify Consumer Data 
Consumers today leave a wealth of personal data in the 
hands of companies that have a financial interest in collecting 
and selling their data for a broad range of purposes, including 
targeted marketing, product development, and market 
research. As Schneier explained, “[s]urveillance is the 
business model of the internet. Everyone is under constant 
surveillance by many companies, ranging from social 
networks like Facebook to cellphone providers. The data is 
collected, compiled, analyzed, and used to try to sell us 
stuff. . . . We’re the product, not the customer.”121 Regarding 
constraints on surveillance, Schneier remarked, “[o]ur system 
is optimized for companies that do everything that is legal to 
maximize profits, with little nod to morality”—a legal 
structure that has been termed “surveillance capitalism.”122 
For instance, targeted marketing has emerged as a strong 
financial incentive123 to track and aggregate consumer data. 
As the FTC has explained, “The practice, which is typically 
invisible to consumers, allows businesses to align their ads 
more closely to the inferred interests of the audience. . . . 
[B]usinesses generally use ‘cookies’ to track consumers’ 
[online] activities and associate those activities with a 
particular computer or device.”124 The FTC also recognized 
the significant potential for re-identification in this context: 
 
121 Mineo, supra note 99 (quoting cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, 
“What we have is many ‘Little Brothers:’ Google, Facebook, Verizon, etc. 
They have enormous amounts of data on everybody, and they want to 
monetize it.”). 
122 Id.  
123 Stakeholders include advertisers, who use targeted marketing to 
increase their brand awareness and thereby sell products, and publishers, 
who raise revenue by offering valuable ad placement. See, e.g., The True 
Cost of Ad Blockers for Advertisers and Publishers, ALTITUDE, 
http://altitudedigital.com/byline/the-true-cost-of-ad-blockers-for-
advertisers-and-publishers/ [perma.cc/Q5ME-ZGSD].  
124 FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2–3 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-
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For example, a consumer’s Internet activity might 
reveal the restaurants in the neighborhood where she 
eats, the stores at which she shops, the property 
values of houses recently sold on her block, and the 
medical conditions and prescription drugs she is 
researching; when combined, such information would 
constitute a highly detailed and sensitive profile that 
is potentially traceable to the consumer.125  
Meanwhile, an entire industry has emerged for the sole 
purpose of collecting, consolidating, monetizing, and selling 
consumer data. As the FTC recognized, “In today’s economy, 
Big Data is big business. And data brokers—companies that 
collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share 
that information with others—play a key role.”126 Data 
brokers collect data about consumers from a wide range of 
sources—social media accounts, public records, consumer 
purchase data, and web browsing activities, to name a few—
without consumers’ knowledge, and consolidate this data to 
resell it for purposes such as targeted marketing campaigns.  
According to an FTC report examining nine data brokers, 
such firms “collect and store billions of data elements, 
including some on nearly every U.S. consumer. . . . one of the 
nine data brokers has 3,000 data segments for nearly every 
 
principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf 
[perma.cc/9HHC-24WD] (containing guidance “designed to serve as the 
basis for industry self-regulatory efforts to address privacy concerns”). 
125 Id. at 22–23. 
126 Bridget Small, FTC Report Examines Data Brokers, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (May 27, 2014), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2014/05/ftc-
report-examines-data-brokers [perma.cc/LE6P-558U]. See also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-
call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [perma.cc/8SBM-BSAN] [hereinafter 
FTC DATA BROKER REPORT]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Recommends Congress Require the Data Broker Industry to be More 
Transparent and Give Consumers Greater Control over Their Personal 
Information (May 27, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker-industry-
be-more [perma.cc/2FTN-FZKV] [hereinafter FTC Report Press Release]. 
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U.S. consumer.”127 In releasing the report, FTC Chairwoman 
Edith Ramirez stated, “The extent of consumer profiling today 
means that data brokers often know as much—or even more—
about us than our family and friends, including our online and 
in-store purchases, our political and religious affiliations, our 
income and socioeconomic status, and more.”128 
The emergence of data brokers is especially alarming in 
the anonymization context because data brokers have an 
incentive to re-identify consumer data. That is, a largely 
unregulated129 and highly lucrative130 industry exists that 
enables and incentivizes adversaries to deanonymize data. 
The FTC recognized this fact in its report containing the FTC 
Privacy Framework, referencing a commentator who “pointed 
out that certain industries extensively mine data for 
marketing purposes and that re-identification is a commercial 
enterprise.”131 The FTC later acknowledged, “not only is it 
possible to re-identify non-PII data through various means, 
businesses have strong incentives to actually do so.”132  
The FTC also noted the growing risk of re-identification in 
its 2014 report on data brokers, which explained, “[D]ata 
brokers generally do not delete the consumer’s information 
from their systems. Instead, they maintain the information in 
order to be able to match records that they may receive in the 
future. . . .”133 To put it simply, these data brokers house a 
massive quantity of consumer data, which provides them with 
the ability to match anonymized data records to their data 
stores and thereby re-identify data subjects. 
 
127 Small, supra note 126. 
128 FTC Report Press Release, supra note 126. For instance, in one 
publicized incident, a teenager’s father complained to Target about sending 
his daughter promotions for baby products, only to find out that his 
daughter was pregnant and had not told her parents yet. See Charles 
Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html. 
129 See, e.g., FTC Report Press Release, supra note 126. 
130 One of the data brokers the FTC examined, Acxiom, reported over 
$800 million in revenue. FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 126, at 23. 
131 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 18–19. 
132 Id. at 20 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)).  
133 FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 126, at 43.  
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IV. GUIDANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
ANONYMIZATION UNDER THE GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION 
As Part II of this Note discussed, U.S. data protection laws 
currently provide safe harbors for data that has been 
anonymized in compliance with their standards. However, as 
Part III of this Note explained, data anonymization does not 
permanently protect the privacy of data subjects due to the 
potential for deanonymization—the re-identification of data 
subjects. Deidentification is a real risk, as data brokers have 
strong financial incentives to re-identify consumer data, and 
the ubiquity of data collection makes deanonymization easier. 
Because U.S. data protection laws exempt anonymized 
data, data subjects who are re-identified ultimately receive no 
statutory privacy or data security protections in the United 
States. Technological advancements, such as those discussed 
in Section III.B, exacerbate privacy challenges by enabling 
pervasive and sensitive data collection, incentivizing users to 
trade privacy for convenience, and increasing consumers’ 
reliance on technology. Given that consumers often lack any 
real choice in deciding whether to “opt-out” of the modern 
realities of technology and data collection, the current lack of 
protection in the face of deanonymization is inadequate.  
This Part will examine the European Union’s approach to 
data anonymization under the existing Data Protection 
Directive (the “Directive”) and the forthcoming GDPR to 
suggest that the United States follow the European Union’s 
lead. In particular, this Part will argue that the United States 
should amend its data protection laws to introduce a principle 
akin to the GDPR’s “pseudonymization”—the concept that 
certain deidentified data that has not been rendered truly 
anonymous due to the potential for re-identification falls 
within the scope of the governing privacy rule, but receives 
relaxed requirements designed to incentive anonymization 
and thereby reduce the linkability of the data to its subjects.  
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A. Anonymization in the European Union 
Generally, the European Union has more stringent privacy 
regulations than the United States.134 Unlike the United 
States, the European Union—specifically, the European 
Commission (the “EC”)—enforces comprehensive, cross-
industry data privacy regulation. Currently, the European 
Union operates under the 1995 Directive. However, the EC 
adopted the GDPR on April 27, 2016, which is scheduled to 
replace the Directive on May 25, 2018. While both the 
Directive and the GDPR are comprehensive data privacy 
regulations, the GDPR imposes many heightened privacy 
protections, including key anonymization requirements.135 
1. The 1995 Data Protection Directive 
The existing Directive regulates the processing of 
“personal data.”136 The Directive defines “personal data” as 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person,” and defines an “identifiable” person as one 
“who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural, or social identity.”137  
Recital 26 of the Directive exempts anonymized data from 
any regulation. In particular, it states: “[T]he principles of 
protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such 
 
134 As Bruce Schneier noted, there are more controls over government 
surveillance in the United States than in Europe, and more constraints on 
corporations in Europe than in the United States. Mineo, supra note 99 
(explaining that this variance has occurred because “Americans tend to 
mistrust government and trust corporations,” while “Europeans tend to 
trust government and mistrust corporations”). 
135 See generally Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR, IAPP, 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr/ 
[perma.cc/TA9A-D78U]. 
136 The concept of “personal data” under E.U. law is comparable to that 
of PII under U.S. law. Note that Article 8 of the Directive includes a separate 
category of “special” personal data (i.e., sensitive data), which receives extra 
protections under the Directive. See supra note 38.  
137 Id. at art. 2(a). 
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a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable.”138 To 
determine whether a data subject is “identifiable,” Recital 26 
provides that “account should be taken of all the means likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other 
person to identify the said person.”139  
In 2014, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party140 
released a non-binding opinion (the “Opinion”) assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of various anonymization 
techniques “by taking account of the residual risk of 
reidentification inherent in each of them.”141 In reference to 
Article 26, the Opinion emphasized that “[a]n important factor 
is that the processing must be irreversible,” and “as 
permanent as erasure, i.e. making it impossible to process 
personal data.”142 The Opinion concluded that 
“anonymization techniques can provide privacy guarantees 
and may be used to generate efficient anonymization 
processes, but only if their application is engineered 
appropriately,” which requires clearly defined prerequisites 
and objectives determined on a case-by-case basis as well as a 
combination of different techniques.143 It also stated that data 
controllers should “not rely on the ‘release and forget’ 
 
138 Id. at rec. 26. 
139 Id.  
140 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (the “WP”) is an 
independent European advisory body on data protection and privacy set up 
under Art. 29 of the Directive. Id. at art. 29.  
141 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on 
Anonymization Techniques, EUROPA 3 (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf 
[perma.cc/HHF4-K4QZ]. The Opinion analyzed the following 
anonymization techniques: noise addition, permutation, differential 
privacy, aggregation, k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness. The opinion 
clarified that “‘identification’ not only means the possibility of retrieving a 
person’s name and/or address, but also includes potential identifiability by 
singing out, linkability and inference.” Id. at 10. 
142 Id. at 5–6, 9 (“An effective anonymization solution prevents all 
parties from singling out an individual in a dataset, from linking two 
records within a dataset (or between two separate datasets) and from 
inferring any information in such dataset.”). 
143 Id. at 3–4. 
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approach,” but rather identify new risks and re-evaluate 
residual risks regularly, assess whether the controls for 
identified risks suffice, and monitor and control the risks.144  
Importantly, the Opinion introduced the concept of 
“pseudonymization,” which “consists of replacing one 
attribute (typically a unique attribute) in a record by 
another.”145 The Opinion clarified that pseudonymization is 
“not a method of anonymisation” but “merely reduces the 
linkability of a dataset with the original identity of a data 
subject, and is accordingly a useful security measure.”146 To 
this effect, the Opinion emphasized that it is still possible to 
single out an individual’s records, link records related to an 
individual, and infer information concerning an individual 
from pseudonymized data. The Opinion described the five 
most common pseudonymization techniques: (1) encryption 
with a secret key;147 (2) hash function;148 (3) keyed-hash 
function with stored key;149 (4) deterministic encryption or 
keyed-hash function with deletion of the key;150 and (5) 
 
144 Id. at 24. 
145 Id. at 20.  
146 Id. at 3, 10. 
147 Id. at 20 (“[T]he holder of the key can trivially re-identify each data 
subject through decryption of the dataset because the personal data are still 
contained in the dataset, albeit in an encrypted form. Assuming that a state-
of-the-art encryption scheme was applied, decryption can only be possible 
with the knowledge of the key.”). 
148 Id. (“[T]his corresponds to a function which returns a fixed size 
output from an input of any size (the input may be a single attribute or a 
set of attributes) and cannot be reversed; this means that the reversal risk 
seen with encryption no longer exists. However, if the range of input values 
the hash function are known they can be replayed through the hash function 
in order to derive the correct value for a particular record.”). 
149 Id. (“[T]his corresponds to a particular hash function which uses a 
secret key as an additional input (this differs from a salted hash function as 
the salt is commonly not secret). A data controller can replay the function 
on the attribute using the secret key, but it is much more difficult for an 
attacker to replay the function without knowing the key as the number of 
possibilities to be tested is sufficiently large as to be impractical.”). 
150 Id. at 21 (“[T]his technique may be equated to selecting a random 
number as a pseudonym for each attribute in the database and then deleting 
the correspondence table.”). 
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tokenization,151 foreshadowing the changes surrounding the 
anonymization exemption implemented under the GDPR. 
2. The General Data Protection Regulation 
The GDPR is similar to the Directive in that it regulates 
only “personal data,” but affords a number of new protections 
to data subjects. For instance, the concept of identifiability 
under the GDPR accounts for new types of potentially 
identifying information. Specifically, the GDPR expands the 
definition of an “identifiable” person to “one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”152  
With respect to anonymization, Recital 26 of the GDPR 
includes several new provisions and is more focused on re-
identification risk than the Directive. Though the GDPR 
continues to exempt “anonymous” data,153 it heightens the 
threshold for determining whether a natural person is 
“identifiable” by specifically including indirect means of re-
identification, stating that “account should be taken of all the 
means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, 
either by the controller or by another person to identify the 
natural person directly or indirectly.”154 Further, unlike the 
 
151 Id. (“[T]his technique is typically applied in (even if it is not limited 
to) the financial sector to replace card ID numbers by values that have 
reduced usefulness for an attacker. It is derived from the previous ones 
being typically based on the application of one-way encryption mechanisms 
or the assignment, through an index function, of a sequence number or a 
randomly generated number that is not mathematically derived from the 
original data.”). 
152 GDPR art. 4(1) (emphasis added). 
153 Id. at rec. 26 (stating “[t]his Regulation does not therefore concern 
the processing of such anonymous information,” meaning “information 
which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to 
personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject 
is not or no longer identifiable”). 
154 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Directive, the GDPR expands on the meaning of “reasonably 
likely,” stating that “account should be taken of all objective 
factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required 
for identification, taking into consideration the available 
technology at the time of processing and technological 
developments.”155 
Critically for purposes of this Note, Recital 26 relies on the 
concept of pseudonymization. In keeping with the Opinion,156 
the term “pseudonymization” is defined under the GDPR as:  
[T]he processing of personal data in such a manner 
that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a 
specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional 
information is kept separately and is subject to 
technical and organizational measures to ensure that 
the personal data are not attributed to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.157  
In other words, pseudonymization is a security measure 
that is used to reduce the linkability of data to its data 
subjects by separating the data from direct identifiers, but 
does not prevent re-identification.158 Pseudonymization under 
the GDPR includes encryption, and the GDPR requires that 
the encryption “key” be kept separate and secure, instructing 
data administrators to implement appropriate safeguards to 
prevent the “unauthorized reversal of pseudonymization.159  
Pseudonymous data is not exempt from the GDPR. Recital 
26 states, “[p]ersonal data which have undergone 
pseudonymisation . . . should be considered to be information 
 
155 Id.  
156 See supra notes 140–151 and accompanying text. 
157 Id. at art. 4(5). 
158 Pseudonymization has been aptly described as “the conversion of 
data about an identified person into data about a merely ‘identifiable’ 
person.” Waltraut Kotschy, The New General Data Protection Regulation—
Is There Sufficient Pay-Off for Taking the Trouble To Anonymize or 
Pseudonimize Data?, FUTURE PRIVACY FORUM (Nov. 2016), 
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Kotschy-paper-on-
pseudonymization.pdf [perma.cc/58FY-A5S8]. 
159 GDPR rec. 75. 
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on an identifiable natural person,”160 and “[t]he explicit 
introduction of ‘pseudonymisation’ in this regulation is not 
intended to preclude any other measures of data 
protection.”161 However, in recognition of the fact that 
pseudonymization reduces the linkability of data to its data 
subjects, and thereby “can reduce the risks to the data 
subjects,”162 the GDPR explicitly encourages the practice of 
pseudonymization. Specifically, the GDPR states that 
pseudonymization is a security measure that companies 
should implement “by default” or “as soon as possible,”163 and 
encourages data controllers to adopt the “pseudonymisation of 
personal data” as a “code of conduct” to “contribute to the 
proper application of this Regulation.”164 
Though pseudonymized data is not exempt from the 
GDPR, the GDPR includes a number of important “incentives 
to apply pseudonymisation when processing personal 
data.”165 Emphasizing that pseudonymized data retains 
information value, Recital 29 states: 
[M]easures of pseudonymisation should, whilst 
allowing general analysis, be possible within the same 
controller when that controller has taken technical 
and organizational measures necessary to ensure, for 
the processing concerned, that this Regulation is 
implemented, and that this additional information for 
attributing the personal data to a specific data subject 
is kept separately.166 
Moreover, the GDPR creates incentives for data controllers 
to apply pseudonymization by allowing pseudonymization to 
satisfy several of the requirements that it imposes.167 First, 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at rec. 28. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at rec. 78. 
164 Id. at art. 40(1)–(2)(d). 
165 Id. at rec. 29. 
166 Id. at rec. 29. 
167 The incentives created by the GDPR to pseudonymize data have 
been thoroughly summarized by IAPP. See Gabe Maldoff, Top 10 
Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 8—Pseudonymization, IAPP (Feb. 
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data controllers who pseudonymize personal data are allowed 
more flexibility to process data beyond original collection 
purposes. The GDPR requires that data be collected for 
“specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes,” but creates an exception to the further processing 
limitation if data is done so in a way “compatible” with the 
initial purposes of collection, and states that one factor in 
determining such compatibility is whether the data was 
pseudonymized.168 Second, pseudonymization can satisfy the 
“appropriate safeguard” required for processing personal data 
for “archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes.” 169 Third, 
pseudonymization can satisfy the “data protection by design 
and by default” requirement introduced in the GDPR, which 
requires data controllers to implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures “both at the time of the 
determination of the means for processing and at the time of 
the processing itself.”170 Fourth, pseudonymization can 
satisfy the GDPR’s data security requirements—namely the 
requirement that controllers implement risk-based measures 
for protecting data security—and may allow data controllers 
to avoid notification requirements.171 Finally, if the data 
controller applies pseudonymization prohibiting it from 
identifying a data subject without the use of additional 
information (e.g., by permanently deleting the key), the 
controller receives an exemption from the rights to access, 
rectification, erasure, and portability required under the 
GDPR; however, this exemption is inapplicable if a data 
subject provides the controller with additional information 




168 GDPR art. 5, art 6(4)(e). 
169 Id. at art. 89(1), rec. 156. 
170 Id. at art. 25(1). 
171 Id. at art. 32 
172 Id. at art. 11, art. 15–20. 
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B. The United States Should Follow the European 
Union’s Approach to Anonymization Under the 
General Data Protection Regulation 
1. The Benefit of the European Union’s Approach 
The United States currently embraces an all-or-nothing 
approach to anonymization. Either data is anonymized in 
compliance with the standards set by the relevant regulation 
and therefore exempt from the regulation entirely, or data is 
subject to the full extent of the regulation’s requirements.173 
Insofar as the FTC and other entities are correct in 
thinking that some form of an exemption or other regulatory 
incentive is necessary to incentivize data controllers to 
anonymize their data,174 U.S. data protection laws currently 
provide no means of incentivizing the de-identification of data 
subjects while providing statutory privacy protections to those 
same data subjects. The obstruction or removal of PII from a 
dataset protects consumer privacy to the extent that it 
reduces the linkability of data to its data subjects and thereby 
reduces the risk of identification. Thus, the practice of 
anonymization should indeed be encouraged. However, due to 
the failure of anonymization to permanently protect the 
privacy of data subjects—and given the sensitive nature of the 
data that may be at issue as well as consumers’ growing 
inability to opt out of data-sharing—U.S. data protection laws 
should protect anonymized data subjects if they are re-
identified—a realistic concern given the ubiquity of data 
collection and the incentives that data brokers have to re-
identify data.175 Currently, U.S. data protection laws provide 
no privacy protections to re-identified data subjects, 
regardless of the potential sensitivity of the data at issue.  
An ideal solution from a privacy perspective would marry 
the practice of anonymization with additional statutory 
protections for consumers, such as transparency, choice, and 
data security. And while U.S. data protection laws fail to 
 
173 See supra Section II.B. 
174 See supra notes 58, 82 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text. 
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conceive of a less demanding standard of anonymization or 
any form of de-identification beyond that which is rewarded 
with a complete exemption, the European Union has 
accomplished just that. By introducing pseudonymization into 
the GDPR, the European Union has implemented a means to 
both (1) incentivize de-identification,176 thereby reducing the 
linkability of data to its data subjects, and (2) keep de-
identified data within the scope of the privacy regulation, 
thereby affording data subjects additional privacy 
protections.177 The European Union has conceived of multiple 
tiers of de-identification—namely (1) anonymization and (2) 
pseudonymization—that vary in their degree of re-
identification risk and information value, and has subjected 
those categories of data to different privacy requirements 
based on their relative risk of re-identification. 
2. The European Union’s Approach Accords with 
Solutions Proposed in the United States 
The European Union’s solution to the failure of 
anonymization falls within the range of proposals that have 
surfaced in the anonymization debate in the United States. 
The European Union does not entirely embrace the approach 
of Paul Ohm—the abandonment of de-identification—nor does 
the European Union fully adopt the alternative approach of 
Jane Yakowitz—prioritizing the free flow of information.178 
Rather, the European Union meets both scholars half way, 
balancing privacy with utility by coupling de-identification 
with additional privacy requirements to address the failure of 
de-identification and encouraging the free flow of information 
by creating a less demanding standard of de-identification. In 
this respect, the European Union has become risk-tolerant, 
willing to accept a reality in which de-identification fails but 
additional safeguards exist to protect consumer privacy.  
 
176 An analysis of the extent to which the European Union’s incentives 
under the GDPR to pseudonymize data, discussed supra in Section IV.A.2, 
achieve that objective is outside the scope of this Note. 
177 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
178 See supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
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The European Union’s approach to pseudonymization is 
most akin to that proposed by Hartzog and Rubinstein—that 
the objective of data protection laws be risk management as 
opposed to perfect anonymization, and that sound data-
release policy couples de-identification techniques with other 
technical, physical, and procedural safeguards.179 And while 
Hartzog and Rubinstein recognized that transparency and 
disclosure alone are inadequate to protect consumers,180 the 
European Union too recognizes this by strongly encouraging 
pseudonymization in conjunction with those safeguards.181 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Note proposes that 
the United States conceive of a second tier of de-identification, 
akin to pseudonymization, that falls within the scope of data 
protection laws while receiving relaxed requirements 
designed to still incentivize de-identification. Concededly, 
even with the introduction of pseudonymization, U.S. data 
protection laws would remain subject to the criticism that 
they continue to exempt data that has been anonymized in 
compliance with their requirements, and that there is no such 
thing as truly anonymous data. Perhaps the proper solution is 
more radical than that embraced by the European Union—
perhaps privacy regulations should never exempt de-
identified data whatsoever. However, such an analysis falls 
outside the scope of this Note, and for present purposes, it 
should suffice to suggest that the United States consider and 
encourage a second, less demanding tier of de-identification 
that remains subject to certain statutory privacy 
requirements. In doing so, its regulatory framework would 
achieve a more impressive balance between data utility and 
the risk of privacy harm, while providing protections to data 
subjects faced with the modern-day reality of re-identification. 
 
179 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
180 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 162–172 and accompanying text. 
